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Essay
"As Best to Subserve Their Own Interests":
Lemuel Shaw, Labor Conspiracy,
and Fellow Servants
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY
Over thirty years ago, Leonard Levy, building explicitly on suggestions
first offered by Walter Nelles,' and implicitly on observations made by
Roscoe Pound,2 commented on the unusual conjunction of two deci-
sions announced within weeks of each other in 1842 by Lemuel Shaw,
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.' The cases,
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad,4 which helped create the fellow
servant rule in the United States, and Commonwealth v. Hunt,5 which
involved a prosecution for criminal conspiracy for organizing a labor
union as a closed shop, seemed at odds. Hunt appeared to expand
worker rights to collective action, while Farwell appeared to restrict
worker rights to compensation from workplace injuries. Shaw's apparent
protection of a worker's right to organize, "a pro-worker stance,"
seemed to conflict with his refusal to recognize a worker's right to
recover for an industrial accident in particular circumstances, "an anti-
worker stance." The question is obvious-how can these decisions be
made compatible, or does their incompatibility have to be accepted
with a shrug of the shoulders and a nod toward the evolutionary
progress of the common law?
Alfred S. Konefsky is a professor of law at the State University of New York
at Buffalo.
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Old Explanations
Several explanations of Shaw's decision in Hunt had been offered
before Levy's biography of Shaw. Nelles, for example, suggested that
tariff protection was the driving force behind Shaw's opinion. Assuming
that worker support for the protective tariff was essential for its passage,
Nelles argued that "the pro-labor decision was the price of warding off
a radical movement in politics that would capitalize upon workers'
grievances and jeopardize the protective tariff on Massachusetts tex-
tiles."'6 Levy dismissed Nelles's "tariff" theory, finding it "less easy to
explain the actual decision- so favorable to workers-which came
from a bench composed exclusively of Federalist-Whigs, presided over
by Lemuel Shaw, all of whom shared the outlook of the propertied
classes and were trained in the crusty conservatism of the common
law."' More to the point, Levy found it "even more perplexing because
it followed on the heels of Farwell .... which forced workers to bear
the cost of injuries caused by the negligence of fellow servants, and
correspondingly reduced industry's overhead expenses." '8 As Nelles had
said many years before when pointing out the apparent contradiction
between Farwell and Hunt, Shaw was "no sentimental friend of the
poor workingman." '9
Similarly, Levy dismissed the codification theory, or more accurately,
Shaw's attempt to deflect a codification movement threatening to
undermine the sanctity of the common law, as the impulse behind the
Hunt decision. The "codification" theory sought to demonstrate that
judge-made rules were capable of responding to the forces of change,
thereby making codification -legislative or democratic rules accom-
modating political change- unnecessary. Despite the suggestiveness of
Mark Howe's work,' 0 particularly Howe's juxtaposition of pro-codifi-
cation readings with the Hunt case, Levy concluded that Shaw was not
seeking to defuse the political attack on the common law. Levy argued,
among other things, that the codification "threat,' if indeed it was a
threat, was no longer palpable in Massachusetts by 1842. Nevertheless,
the problem of Farwell was not far from Levy's mind. In explaining
why "Shaw's decision as a check upon the forces of codification must
be cautiously advanced," Levy noted once again that "Hunt was decided
in the same term of the Court as the case that gave life to the fellow-
servant rule. That rule was not calculated to earn the gratitude of the
workers or to disarm the legal reformers. It gave them fresh evidence
of the harshness and upper-class favoritism of the 'judge-made' law. If
Shaw's opinions were given with a half an eye on the codification
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movement .... his two labor decisions tended to cancel each other out,
the one a boon and the other, almost simultaneously, a bane."'"
In recent years, the pro-labor/anti-labor dichotomy of Hunt and
Farwell has been raised again, but this time in an attempt to resolve
the dilemma. Wythe Holt, in a section of his article on labor conspiracy
cases entitled "The Puzzle of Hunt" asks how Shaw, in his "seemingly
pro-labour opinion in Hunt," could have brought "himself even partially
to favour the very workers who, one week before the decision in Hunt
was announced, had been severely damaged by his own anti-labour
ruling in Farwell... ?-,2 Holt's answer is relatively straightforward: a
demonstration that in Hunt "Shaw's opinion was not really pro-
labour."' 3 Christopher Tomlins has also addressed the apparent dis-
crepancy in outcome between Hunt and Farwell in his book, The State
and the Unions. In a brief footnote, he makes the following claim:
"The perspective adopted here resolves the apparent contradiction
between Shaw's 'pro-labor' opinion in [Hunt] and his simultaneous
reaffirmation of the 'anti-labor' fellow servant rule in Farwell .... Both
decisions, of course, were affirmations of freedom of contract." 4
Tomlins is correct in identifying "freedom of contract" as the unifying
principle out of which both opinions grew. His own analysis, distin-
guishing Hunt as an opinion ratifying "voluntarism," that is, sanctioning
the activity of "freely acting individuals" gathering together for legal
purposes in a union, 5 is a valuable insight. It is, however, only a partial
insight into the power of contract ideology. Shaw's opinion in Hunt
goes much deeper, for it is congruent with the "freedom of contract in
the marketplace ideology" that others have identified in his opinion in
Farwell. I6 Tomlins, however, has clarified the problem: Hunt and Farwell
should no longer be analyzed as pro-labor or anti-labor. They may be
described in that fashion, but to do so misses the point. They are
opinions that reveal more in their similarities than in their differences.
The unifying power of the contractual argument in both opinions
provides us with greater insight into the growth and impact of market
ideology in the legal culture of the period. In this analysis, Shaw is
revealed as a sophisticated manipulator of the images of a declining
republicanism and an ascending economic liberalism, a manipulator
in service of establishing freely bargaining agents as the paradigm for
analyzing legal relations.
The Opinions
The starting point for establishing the links between Farwell and
Hunt is in the language and concepts of the opinions themselves.
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Farwell
The story in Farwell is a familiar one. Nicholas Farwell, an engineer
for the Boston and Worcester Railroad, had his right hand "crush[ed]
and destroy[ed]"' 7 during a derailment caused, according to Farwell,
by the negligent actions of his fellow servant, Whitcomb the switchman,
who placed a track switch in the wrong position. Farwell sought
compensation from the railroad, not from Whitcomb, who threw the
switch. In rejecting Farwell's theory of liability, Shaw held that the
railroad was not liable for an injury inflicted by a fellow servant, even
assuming that the injury was negligently caused by one of the railroad's
own employees. In the course of his opinion, Shaw left little doubt
that if the actions of its employee caused injury to a third person-a
passenger or "stranger" rather than a fellow servant-the railroad
would be legally responsible. What course of reasoning led Shaw to
this result?
Farwell's lawyer, C. G. Loring, argued that "the plaintiff does not
put his case on the ground of the defendants' liability to passengers,
nor upon the general principle which renders principals liable for the
acts of their agents; but on the ground, that a master, by the nature of
his contract with a servant, stipulates for the safety of the servant's
employment, so far as the master can regulate the matter."8
Shaw took his cue from "learned counsel for the plaintiff."' 9 In the
space of a few paragraphs, Shaw created the analytical apparatus to
govern future discussion of the issues. There could be only two ways
of analyzing the problem: respondeat superior or contract. First, Shaw
established that respondeat superior was not an acceptable legal theory
in this context. A master was normally "answerable" for the negligent
acts of his servant, if the injury was done to a "stranger," someone not
in privity to the master. The rule was "founded on the great principle
of social duty, that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them
as not to injure another.... "20 However, "the great principle," amount-
ing almost to a moral duty, seemed to Shaw only to apply to strangers;
those in privity to the master were treated differently. Respondeat
superior did not apply in Farwell because of its inapplicability to the
facts of the case- no strangers were involved. In addition, Shaw noted
that the plaintiff, through counsel, had conceded that respondeat
superior did not apply. There was an alternative governing principle to
be applied in cases involving "a servant bringing his action against his
own employer.., for an injury arising in the course of that employ-
ment:' and that was the "contract between them."22
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"The claim," Shaw announced, "is placed, and must be maintained,
if maintained at all, on the ground of contract" 23 What kind of contract?
Shaw invoked just two types, express and implied, dismissing the
express contract possibility in one sentence: "As there is no express
contract between the parties, applicable to this point" we are left only
with a possible claim of "implied contract... arising out of the relation
of master and servant." Implied contract meant "an implied promise,
arising from the duty of the master to be responsible to each person
employed by him" in the fellow servant situation.24
Contract must have been important to Shaw, because until this point
in the opinion, he had rejected a standard tort principle and been
unable to find an express agreement. Yet he had allowed the contract
idea to survive in an "implied" state. Shaw seemed to be saying that
contract must be found somewhere because it has independent signif-
icance sufficient to take precedence over the "duty" of a master to a
servant-a duty once fraught with overtones of hierarchy and status.
Loring, in his argument for Farwell, tried to incorporate this duty into
his assertion that the master "by the nature of his contract with a
servant, stipulates for the safety of the servant's employment, so far as
the master can regulate the matter.'' 25
Even as Loring built his case on implied contract, he could not
entirely escape notions of status that placed the "master" in a position
to "regulate the matter." Shaw, in accepting Loring's invitation to imply
a contract, decided that the "nature" of such a contract would look
different. Instead of the master stipulating for the servant's safety, Shaw
found contract terms more consonant with his understanding of what
"arise[s] out of the relation of master and servant." 6 "To say that the
master shall be responsible because the damage is caused by his agents,"
he asserted, "is assuming the very point which remains to be proved." 27
In Shaw's analysis, the implied contract limited liability rather than
created it because the parties were assumed to have allocated the risks
in a particular way. The result may be a move from one kind of
dependent status to another. Instead of status to contract, we have
status to status, with contract easing the way.
Shaw made it very clear that this "implied contract" was a "legal
presumption" 28-a fiction. It was not simply that a contract would be
implied, but that the terms of the contract would also be implied.
Therefore, Shaw had to find these implied terms. What were they?
"The general rule... is, that he who engages in the employment of
another for the performance of specified duties and services, for
compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and
perils incident to the performance of such services, and in legal
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presumption, the compensation is adjusted accordingly."29 In other
words, while there is no evidence as to what the parties actually agreed
to, or whether they even thought of this particular type of arrangement,
we have a powerful mental model of how these things should be worked
out between employer and employee. The model says they bargained
it out and reached an agreement as to where the risks fall. "These are
perils," Shaw reassured us, "which the servant is as likely to know, and
against which he can as effectually guard, as the master. They are perils
incident to the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and
provided for in the rate of compensation as any others "'30 Therefore,
by agreement between themselves, the parties have already decided the
issue of legal injury and compensation. To impose a tort duty, would,
in effect, upset the expectations of the parties, appearing almost as a
retroactive readjustment.
The assusmption that "perils [were] ... provided for in the rate of
compensation," was important because Shaw asserted that "the basis
on which implied promises are raised" amounted to "duties legally
inferred from a consideration of what is best adapted to promote the
benefit of all persons concerned, under given circumstances."" He
argued that "[p]olicy and general convenience" would define "the rights
and obligations arising out of particular relations,"32 or, a new kind of
status, an implied contract in the absence of formal agreements between
the parties. As a result, in a legal sense, the plaintiff's employment
"was a voluntary undertaking on his part, with a full knowledge of the
risks incident to the employment" 33-a "voluntary undertaking" which
was assumed to have occurred upon acceptance of employment.
Shaw's logic was to reject respondeat superior in his search for a
plausible contract agreement. He also rejected any evidence of express
contract, leaving implied contract as the basis for his decision. Con-
tractual presumptions pervade the opinion. Shaw believed that indi-
viduals bargain in the marketplace, working out the details of their
contractual arrangements and rationally calculating the risks and com-
pensation accordingly. There is no recognition of disparity in power,
or class, or status. People simply meet and resolve their differences on
a common ground. They buy and sell what each one wants. They are
not dependent or bound, but independent and free, enough so that
judges can infer how they would have acted if they actually bargained.
This, Shaw argued, is how people think, decide, and act, and it can be
sanctioned legally. Shaw could assume people acted this way because
he was convinced that the exchange and market model of human
interaction was beyond question. People governed their lives through
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freedom of contract; the legal system, by implying a contract in the
Farwell case, ratified the process.
Commonwealth v. Hunt
Leonard Levy has admirably summarized the circumstances leading
to the indictment of the union for conspiracy.
[The] case was instigated, in 1840, not by an employer but by a disgruntled
employee, one Jeremiah Home, a member of the Boston Journeymen
Bootmakers' Society. The union fined Home for having done some extra
work without pay, an infraction of union rules. The fine was removed
after Home's employer recompensed him, but he seems to have borne
a grudge. Soon fined again for another infraction, he refused to pay
despite the advice of his employer who even offered to give him the
money. The union countered by expelling Home, requiring that he sign
its rules and pay fines totaling seven dollars as a condition of his
reinstatement. When he stubbornly persisted in his defiance, again
rejecting his employer's advice to become a member in good standing,
the union insisted that he be fired. The employer, probably anxious to
avoid a strike, complied; he knew the union's rule that its members
would not work for anyone employing a non-member whose discharge
had been demanded. Home then complained to the District Attorney,
Samuel D. Parker, who seems to have mustered a loathing for workers'
organizations .... 14
As a result, an indictment was shortly forthcoming.
Was the attempt by the union, "to maintain what a later age called
a closed shop,"" an illegal conspiracy? Shaw's classic test required that
"a conspiracy must be a combination of two or more persons, by some
concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose,
or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by
criminal or unlawful means."36 Either unlawful purpose, or the use of
unlawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose, would do. Shaw found
neither an unlawful purpose nor an unlawful means in the activities
of the Journeymen Bootmakers as enumerated in the indictment. No
illegal purpose or means had been alleged in the indictment, and no
charge of conspiracy was therefore sustainable.
The formation of a combination by journeymen was not in itself an
unlawful act.... Whether a combination was a criminal conspiracy or
not depended on its purposes. In this case the prosecution had treated
the society's constitution as proof in itself of criminality, and had not
specified any illegal purpose. But all that the constitution showed was
that the society's purpose was to induce all those engaged in the
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bootmaking trade to join. This provided no proof of illegality, but only
of intent to strengthen the power of the society. Such power might be
used for "damaging or pernicious" purposes or for "useful and honorable"
ones. But in either event it was the objects of a society, as expressed in
its constitution or articulated during a strike, which henceforth would
determine its legal status. 7
Why didn't Shaw believe that the bootmakers were engaged in an
illegal conspiracy? What rationale did he adopt to support his insight?
The answers seem to lie in Shaw's application of freedom of contract
to the circumstances in Hunt. As he examined the various counts in
the indictment, Shaw made a number of observations.
Shaw understood that members of the union "would not work for
a person, who, after due notice, should employ a journeyman not a
member of their society."38 As to whether these were illegal means,
Shaw said: "The case supposes that these persons are not bound by
contract, but free to work for whom they please, or not to work, if
they so prefer. In this state of things, we cannot perceive, that it is
criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own acknowledged
rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interests."39 Each
individual had a right to contract; an aggregate of those rights, exercised
with lawful purpose or means, should not change anything in a legal
sense. Groups, like individuals, should be allowed within certain limits
to pursue their own self-interests, in fact, they were expected and
encouraged to do so.1°
To reinforce this notion, Shaw turned to a different situation. "We
do not understand that the agreement was, that the defendants would
refuse to work for an employer, to whom they were bound by contract
for a certain time, in violation of that contract .... It is perfectly
consistent ... that the effect of the agreement was, that when they were
free to act, they would not engage with an employer, or continue in
his employment, if such employer, when free to act, should engage
with a workman, .. . not a member of the association. If a large number
of men, engaged for a certain time, should combine together to violate
their contract, and quit their employment together, it would present a
very different question."' All their activity amounted to under the
indictment "was an agreement, as to the manner in which they would
exercise an acknowledged right to contract with others for their labor."42
Shaw accomplished much in a few short pages. First he juxtaposed
what he concluded was a legitimate activity -gathering together to
decide whether or not to enter freely into contracts in the marketplace -
with what might be an illegitimate purpose or means: violating or
breaking contracts by stopping work. Second, he suggested that either
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in entering or violating agreements, the idea of freedom of contract
predominated. As clear as it was that workers were free to contract, it
was equally clear that breaking contracts was intolerable. The market
system might flounder if contract violations were countenanced. The
assertion that people had an "acknowledged right to contract with
others for their labor" meant little if those contracts could be violated
with impunity. The sanctity of the promise had to be protected:
agreements should be encouraged, violations discouraged.
To highlight the dichotomy between entering and breaking contracts,
Shaw then discussed Boston Glass v. Binney, a case in which one
employer allegedly enticed an employee to leave another employer in
violation of his contract. The case, Shaw said, "acknowledges the
established principle, that every free man, whether skilled laborer,
mechanic, farmer or domestic servant, may work or not work, or work
or refuse to work with any company or individual, at his own option,
except so far as he is bound by contract.'4 In other words, Shaw
supported the workers in their quest to contract freely within the
conventions of mid-nineteenth-century Massachusetts life, but also
supported the contract a worker freely entered. In any event, Shaw
established that unions under certain circumstances belonged in the
marketplace as potential contracting entities.
Finally, Shaw dealt with the count in the indictment alleging that
the purpose of the conspiracy was "to impoverish" others illegally, in
particular Home, the "disgruntled" bootmaker.
The same thing may be said of all competition in every branch of trade
and industry; and yet it is through that competition, that the best interests
of trade and industry are promoted. It is scarcely necessary to allude to
the familiar instances of opposition lines of conveyance, rival hotels,
and the thousand other instances, where each strives to gain custom to
himself, by ingenious improvements, by increased industry, and by all
the means by which he may lessen the price of commodities, and thereby
diminish the profits of others.
We think, therefore, that associations may be entered into, the object
of which is to adopt measures that may have a tendency to impoverish
another, that is, to diminish his gains and profits, and yet so far from
being criminal or unlawful, the object may be highly meritorious and
public spirited. The legality of such an association will therefore depend
upon the means to be used for its accomplishment. If it is to be carried
into effect by fair or honorable and lawful means, it is, to say the least,
innocent.... "4
The idea of competition grew out of the idea of freedom of contract.
People were free to maximize their interests; competition followed,
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and, so the theory went, the public would benefit from greater choice
and reduced costs. Some might be hurt, but the harm was a result of
the natural operation of the marketplace, not of any activity that was
formally illegal. Leonard Levy has noted that "Shaw was sufficiently
objective to take into account what any realist must understand, that
in the normal relations between employers and employees, bargaining
inevitably involves restraints and pressures of a sort, as did competition
itself... ." From "the premise that competition among businessmen
benefits the public, although some persons may suffer, Shaw had implied
that competition among employers and employees, and among em-
ployees themselves, also benefits the public, although some may suffer "'46
As Levy analyzed it, "[t]he whole process was justified by the supposition
that when men freely pursued their own interests, individually or in
combination, society generally stood to gain "47
In Farwell, Shaw had assumed that it was important to imply the
existence of a contract to insure that in certain situations all concerned
parties would benefit. If the employer and employee had not formally
agreed on a contract, Shaw would impose his understanding of what
he thought they would have agreed on if they had the opportunity. In
Hunt, Shaw seemed to say that everyone should have the opportunity
to enter freely into contracts. If people wished to puruse their self-
interests, either by choosing when to contract or when not to contract,
that behavior was as appropriate and legitimate for groups as it was
for individuals. What was important was to encourage participation in
the marketplace. In Hunt, Shaw suggested that if labor groups behaved
in a certain way they belonged in the marketplace, just as individuals
did. Labor unions, like individuals, were freely contracting entities.
If Shaw assumed a contractual universe in Farwell, he had also to
allow the freedom to contract in Hunt. Though Shaw clearly feared at
this time that group norms or activities might cause social dislocation,48
he did not seem primarily concerned about it. The bootmakers did
not appear to be threatening collective action that was coercive in a
legal sense; they were just individuals acting together as they had every
right to act individually. As Tomlins perceived, "in place of a corporative
body restraining trade by its very nature," Shaw "found nothing but a
group of free individuals who had agreed to improve their economic
welfare by jointly refusing to work for employers of non-confederates."4 9
Instead of analyzing how this group could distort the freedom to
contract in a number of ways by aggregating, Shaw chose to emphasize
their legitimacy "insofar as they had become and remained associations
of free acting individuals. 5° The bootmakers were simply a voluntary,
self-governing body.
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In Hunt and Farwell, Shaw did not adopt a pro-labor or anti-labor
stance, rather he analyzed the cases within a freedom of contract
ideology which encompassed all kinds and forms of contractual activity.
But a question remains: Why did Shaw frame the two cases within the
same mode of analysis?
New Explanations
Over the last two decades, the study of the early republic has been
dominated by historiographical discussions of two powerful paradigms:
republicanism and liberalism. In addition to developing the constituent
elements of each, historians have also ventured to guess as to the
relationship between the two models of thought. An extended analysis
of the historiographical debates would be inappropriate here, but a
brief look at the complex categories of republicanism and liberalism
might provide a framework for determining how Shaw constructed the
opinions in Farwell and Hunt.
Shaw had his feet planted in both the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries-a better metaphor might be that he had one foot planted
in each century. An earlier historiography might have referred to him
as a "transitional" figure. At the very least, republicanism and liberalism
had a profound impact during his lifetime." There is, of course, a risk
of misusing or abusing the explanatory categories themselves. Repub-
licanism and liberalism may have been called on to explain too much,
to have become over-inclusive, and to have lost some of their explan-
atory bite. However, by employing them as suggestive devices, we might
be able to shed new light on a conceptual universe that once appeared
to historians as contradictory, confusing, or unexplainable.
The problem in employing the concepts of republicanism and lib-
eralism for purposes of this brief essay is to articulate a working
definition of them that will lend direction, but not one so truncated
as to be simplistic-a shorthand that sufficiently conveys meaning out
of a rich ongoing debate. There are several working definitions that fit
these criteria by conveying much of the complexity of the concepts,
but retaining sufficient precision to be useful in suggesting Shaw's
patterns of thought. The definitions come from G. Edward White's
recent volume on the Marshall Court, 2 and from the labor historian
Sean Wilentz.
White argues that "Marshall Court jurisprudence can be seen as
heavily influenced by a special version of republicanism, a version that
represented a fusion of classical republicanism and other trans-Atlantic
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ideologies."53 White is sensitive to what he describes as the "accom-
modation of republican theory to cultural change." He has skillfully
taken into account modern historiography on the subject, deftly bringing
together and summarizing various strands of republicanism to explain
how the Marshall Court justices approached their jurisprudence. 4
There are three elements to White's use of the theory of republicanism,
and the first is an understanding of classical republicanism:
The basic premise of classical republicanism was that in the ideal form
of government, a republic, individual liberty and self-fulfillment would
be achieved through civic virtue, the active participation by citizens in
political life. The purpose of a representative government was to ensure
this citizen participation and to eradicate unrepresentative centers of
power, such as institutions modeled on monarchical courts, that spawned
corruption. Classical republicanism also advocated the wider distribution
of property among citizens so as to forestall the kind of dependence that
led to demagoguery and mass unrest. But both civic participation and
the distribution of wealth were to be limited by the imperatives of social
class: the virtuous citizens that managed a republic were to be enlisted
from a relatively narrow circle of educated, propertied, socially prominent
persons who would represent others. 5
Second, White demonstrates that this classical republicanism fused
with a number of trans-Atlantic ideologies to form a "special version
of republicanism." In particular, he argues that "the concept of virtue
subordinated individual self-interest to the good of society as a whole,
and citizen participation was essentially a disinterested exercise. Here
classical republicanism found its posture in awkward juxtaposition to
the loosening of hierarchical economic relationships that marked the
emergence of a capitalist economy.... "56 This "loosening" signified
the rise of liberalism, one of the trans-Atlantic ideologies fusing with
republicanism.
The redefinition of the value of individual economic activity in a market
has been identified as the dominant factor in fostering the emergence of
an ideology that was in a sense competitive with classical republican-
ism.... Liberalism, in its eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century forms,
was founded on the premise that individual self-fulfillment could be best
encouraged by allowing individuals to pursue their economic, and to
some extent their political, self-interests. Liberalism was an ideology of
permissiveness rather than an ideology of restraint: it encouraged free
markets, restricted governmental intervention in the affairs of individual
citizens, and to a limited degree promoted a broadening of the political
base of government. While liberalism shared with classical republicanism
a sense that property was an important foundation of society, its advocates
tended to emphasize the role of property as a source of economic freedom
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and productivity rather than as a source of political and social stability.
Liberalism also tended to encourage the pursuit of commerce for both
individual self-fulfillment and social improvement; commerce had been
identified by classical republicanism as a source of luxury and decay. It
is possible to characterize many of the important debates of early-
nineteenth-century political economy, such as the role of corporations
or the status of economic transactions based on credit, as being clashes
between classical republican and liberal points of view."
Third, White shows how "American republican theory" accommo-
dated cultural change, for example, through "the proposition that
economic activity should simultaneously protect property rights and
be responsive to commerce."58 On this subject, White summarizes a
critical problem.
The principal characteristic of early-nineteenth-century American eco-
nomic life was the emergence of a capitalist market economy, in which
relationships were principally defined by bargaining power in the ex-
change of goods and services rather than by pre-existing social status.
The advent of market capitalism was noted by contemporaries, many
of whom identified a market economy as a transforming feature of
American society. Two broad sets of responses to the emerging market
economy may be noted: a classical republican and a liberal response.
The first response tended to see the market and its institutions, such as
the corporation, as a threat to republican virtue. The marketplace was
a potential source of corruption, an arena in which unchecked self-
interest could flourish, a vehicle for the sudden redistribution of property
and wealth, and a distraction from civic pursuits. The latter response
embraced the market and made it a source not only of increased
prosperity, wealth, and "improvements," but as a forum in which equality,
in the form of enhanced competitive opportunities, could be promoted
and economic privilege broken down. Few economic theorists articulated
a wholly republican or wholly liberal response to the market; most
theoretical positions were a blend of the two responses. But the responses
framed discussions of economic theory in the early nineteenth century.59
These excerpts provide useful historical portraits of republicanism,
liberalism, and the tensions between the two produced by the events
of nineteenth-century American life.
Sean Wilentz, however, adds another important dimension to the
discussion and demonstrates how organizing political ideologies, like
republicanism, had thoroughly permeated nineteenth-century society.
Wilentz notes in analyzing artisan festivals in New York City between
1788 and 1837:
Most striking were the ways in which the artisans invoked the key
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concepts of the Atlantic republican tradition, "independence," "virtue"
"commonwealth" (or "community"), and "citizenship" Independence,
they explained, stood not only for the freedom to ply their trades outside
the shackles of British power, but also for the freedom to work without
the internal restraints and corrupt privilege characteristic of monarchies.
As they honored the interdependence of their own workshop labors, the
craftsmen listened to endless perorations on how American mechanics
lived in a land of personal independence and equal rights where, as one
General Society member put it, no "offensive government" would turn
the artisans into dependent "vassals and slaves." Yet as they spoke of
independence, the artisans also shied away from endorsing the pursuit
of self-interest for its own sake. Each citizen, artisan spokesmen explained,
had to put the interests of the entire community before his own, exercising
what they called, in classical republican style, "virtue." "Be virtuous;'
the Reverend Samuel Miller enjoined his artisan audience in 1795, to
be followed two years later by the master sailmaker George Warner's
declaration that those who sought personal gain alone were unvirtuous,
"distinct from the general interests of the community." Ambition for
power or riches, later speakers confirmed, would only leave America,
like the republics of antiquity, "enervated by luxury [and] depressed by
tyranny' a land where "the [poor] will be found in a state of vassalage
and dependence on the [rich]." The only way to secure the Republic,
they concluded, was for virtuous men of middling property, those whom
Warner described as men who lived in "a state of mediocrity,' to be
active citizens, engaged in the political process.6"
White focuses on the development of republicanism and liberalism in
the ideas of elites, particularly political elites- officeholders, theorists,
and others, who had a certain facility in the formulation and manip-
ulation of political symbols. Wilentz reminds us that citizens other
than elites had a stake in the political discourse, took it seriously, and
tried to shape it to their own ends. In part, what Wilentz describes is
the attempt by the working-class population to seize the high road of
republican rhetoric for their own, to infuse it with their meaning.
Republicanism was thus embraced by the many, as well as the few.
Christopher Tomlins has recently built on Wilentz's insights:
The incipient trade communities of the seaboard cities fragmented in
the fifty years after the Revolution as commercial investment in domestic
industry transformed the relations of workshop production, bringing
about the homogenization of journeymen and smaller masters and
dividing them from the new generation of capitalist employers who now
controlled productive enterprise. This fragmentation was rendered par-
ticularly significant by its occurrence within an ideological context
dominated by heated debates over the meaning of the idioms of "liberty"
and "independence" so central to republican thought. To many of the
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revolutionary generation, the liberty and independence which they cel-
ebrated had promised the establishment of conditions which would
enable free men to contract with one another on a basis of real equality
by guaranteeing their economic and social independence. For others,
however, a revolution fought in behalf of liberty and property necessarily
sanctified the liberty of individuals to use their property productively,
free from the restraints of collective regulation. To the latter, that is,
revolutionary liberty stood for liberty of industry -entrepreneurial lic-
ence. Republican guarantees of independence and autonomy meant no
more than the provision of means whereby individuals might constitute
and regulate their own lives and property through the medium of contract.
They did not encompass measures to ensure their substantive equality
in the bargaining which took place.
To the journeymen, the entrepreneurial interpretation of republicanism
was triply unattractive. It was hostile to the traditions of the trade
community, for these implied the legitimacy of restraints on individual
liberty and property; it justified the production and marketing innovations
which were undermining the status of journeymen within their own
trades; and ultimately it threatened the revolutionary achievement itself,
for as the journeymen conceived it revolutionary society was founded
on virtue, and the major foundation of virtue was their own manly
independence. Their answer was to recast the central concepts of revo-
lutionary republicanism as explicitly collective phenomena.6'
The most meaningful contours of the rhetoric of republicanism and
its aftermath seem clear in the hands of White and Wilentz, but do
they provide any insight into Shaw's opinions in Hunt and Farwel?
These opinions are examples of the ambiguities of republicanism
modified by liberalism, and demonstrate that pro- and anti-labor are
not the most appropriate categories from which to start dissecting the
opinions. The starting point ought to be the shared values that led to
Shaw's struggle to analyze the legal problems in the two cases as similar
and unified and not as dissimilar and inconsistent. The strains of
thought that dominated Shaw's legal rhetoric reveal the various influ-
ences upon him. A strong measure of liberalism is present, modifying,
though not completely, traditional understandings of republicanism.
Shaw, at least implicitly, fused the two traditions.
The crucial, constituent elements in Shaw's opinions are virtue, self-
interest, independence, and equality. But their presence is telling,
indicating how their meaning has changed over time. In the past,
"virtue" demanded that self-interest be "subordinated... to the good
of society as a whole."6 Now Shaw claimed that people were expected
to act in a manner "as best to subserve their own interests."63 Were
such actions lacking in virtue? Virtue, after all, assumes a sacrifice of
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self-interest for the benefit of the whole. Shaw, however, was not
suggesting that virtue was moribund. He was saying that the relationship
between interest and virtue had been transformed, if not redefined.
The problem remained the same-how does society guarantee that the
"whole" prospers? But virtue was beginning to look different, to take
on a new meaning in political economy. "Economic freedom," which
in Shaw's words was being "free to work for whom [you] please "'64
lead to "productivity" and "individual self-fulfillment" was linked to
"social improvement."65 The pursuit of self-interest was no longer
subordinated to the whole; instead the assumption was that self-interest
served the whole, and society generally benefitted from its pursuit.
Shaw's reference to "competition" is instructive as to how the "whole"
benefited from self-interest. Shaw claimed that some economic injury
to individuals may occur because of competition, but that "it is through
that competition, that the best interests of trade and industry are
promoted.' More important, the "object" of competition may be
"public spirited."66 Pursuing self-interest may promote the best interests
of both "trade" and the "public" as goods are more widely distributed
and "prosperity" occurs. The greater "social improvement" was the
goal, if not the rationalization.
Other rhetorical problems quickly fell into place. Dependency was
still frowned on; the wider distribution of property guaranteeing stability
countered the active pursuit of commerce. Shaw was still concerned
with order, but focused more on the economic vehicles that created
independent actors, "free to work..., or not to work."'" The oppor-
tunity to participate in the marketplace promoted "independence,"
rejecting the old world notions of deference, hierarchy, and social status,
along with the fear of dependency.68
The language of independence and freedom, the exchange or bar-
gaining world of contract that Shaw described in Farwell and Hunt,
also carried within it the ambiguous ideas of "equality" or "equal
rights." Being free to bargain in the marketplace meant, in theory, the
opportunity to be dealt with equally, though there were few, if any,
guarantees about the result of bargaining. As Wilentz and Tomlins
point out, the rhetoric of equality was central to the artisanal under-
standing of republicanism, an understanding that differed from the
entrepreneurial implications of the pursuit of self-interest. Artisans were
suspicious of appeals to self-interest which were not tied, as in the past,
to notions of community, nor were they satisfied with the "recasting"
of the relationship between interests and community. But their insistence
on independence and equality could not be ignored. Shaw, in recognizing
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in Hunt that the union was not engaged in illegal activity, was at least
implicitly recognizing the tradition out of which the "independence
and equality" argument grew. Shaw, in effect, said that unions fit as
part of the universe of freely bargaining actors. In particular they were
voluntary, self-governing individuals in a body constituted to represent
their interests, a kind of republican island community on its own. If
workers were really serious about being treated equally, Shaw would
treat them as equal and free, and admit them into the marketplace,
like everyone else, and just like Nicholas Farwell too.69
This is the complicated world of meaning, a changing one, perhaps
contradictory and certainly contested, that Shaw brought with him to
Farwell and Hunt. The outcomes of the cases were not predetermined,
but if the opinions are examined in light of what we now know about
the republican and liberal ideologies current in Shaw's time, it is easier
to understand why the opinions are more unified and connected than
previously thought, and how Shaw might have concluded that they
could be analyzed similarly.
Within a decade or so of Shaw's decisions in Farwell and Hunt,
Massachusetts held a constitutional convention at which Henry Wil-
liams of Taunton invoked the following image:
In a free government like ours, employment is simply a contract between
parties having equal rights. The operative agrees to perform a certain
amount of work in consideration of receiving a certain amount of money.
The work to be performed is, by the contract, an equivalent for the
money to be paid. The relation, when properly entered into, is therefore
one of mutual benefit. The employed is under no greater obligation to
the employer than the employer is to the employed.... In the eye of
the law, they are both freemen -citizens having equal rights, and brethren
having one common destiny.7"
The argument was stated as an unassailable truth, based on common
observation of everyday life. Like Shaw's assumption in Farwell about
how contract bargains must work, Williams asserted that "the work to
be performed is, by the contract, an equivalent for the money to be
paid." The relationship was of "mutual benefit"-each party individ-
ually believing he or she had something to gain. Williams's imagery,
as in Hunt, was of "freemen," with "equal rights," "brethren" bound
together for their "mutual benefit" because, like the old republican
norms, a redefined virtue held them together, sharing "one common
destiny"-presumably the interest of both individuals and society as
a whole. In Hunt and Farwell, Shaw subtly transformed these ideas,
making them more presentable and intelligible for generations to come.
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